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The power of the elites became the dominant explanation of the extension
of the franchise and expansion of the provision of public services. Peru from
1876 to 1940 presents a contrasting case. Although restricting political par-
ticipation through literacy requirements, Peru saw an increase in literacy
and schooling. Nevertheless, the relative power of the national and local
elites articulated the national policies resulting in unequal provision of
education. Constrained political access of the economic minority, the indi-
genous population, translated into a widening gap in terms of educational
attainment.
Keywords: education, political participation, Peru
JEL Code: N36, P16
* Received 23 September 2014. Accepted 24 April 2015. The author would like to thank Peter
Lindert for his comments and suggestions. Thanks to the participants of the Institute of Historical
Research (University of London) seminar and the Department of Economic History at the
Universitat de Barcelona, to three anonymous referees, and to the editors. Jeff Howarth helped
immensely with GIS-related data. Funding for this project comes from the National Science
Foundation and the American Philosophical Society. All errors are the author’s own.
a Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA. larroyoabad@
middlebury.edu
Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History
Vol. 34, No. 1: 81–109. doi:10.1017/S0212610915000233 © Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2015.
81
RESUMEN
El poder de las élites se ha convertido en el factor explanatorio de la
extensión del sufragio y de la provisión de servicios públicos. Perú desde
1876 a 1940 presenta un caso diferente. A pesar de un sistema de sufragio
calificado, restringido a los alfabetos, hubo un aumento en las tasas de
alfabetización y de escolaridad. El poder relativo de las élites nacionales y
regionales se manifestó en la articulación de las políticas nacionales con un
resultado desigual en la provisión de educación. La restricción en el acceso
político de la minoría económica, la población indígena, se convirtió en una
creciente brecha en materia educativa.
Palabras clave: educación, participación política, Perú
1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 19th century, many decades after declaring indepen-
dence from Spain, the new tradition of inclusive political participation in
Peru came to a close. As literacy requirements for suffrage emerged, the
national government swiftly embarked on a campaign for national integra-
tion. A key element in this plan was the expansion of education as a strategy
for inclusion in order to civilise the country’s large indigenous population.
With encouraging national results as literacy rates climbed from 18 per cent
in 1876 to 42 per cent in 1940, sizable disparities came to light, in particular
along ethnic lines.
What explains the unequal educational outcomes in Peru? It was a
divided country not only by its geography (given the imposing Andes) but
also by race and ethnicity1. Of the three main regions, the coast, the sierra
and the jungle, 62 per cent of the total population lived in the sierra with over
80 per cent of the indigenous population of the country in 19402. This
divide translated into unequal political representation given the application
of literacy requirements for suffrage. As literacy levels were lower in com-
munities with higher shares of indigenous population, their preferences
could not be directly expressed in the political system. Political voice mat-
tered, more than economic structure or income. Given the restrictions
imposed on suffrage, the economic minority, the indigenous group, was
politically under-represented. As a result, the benefits of the expansion of the
1 Klaren (1986) claims that, even today, geographic and social divides impede national
integration.
2 The coastal region was home to 29 per cent of the population. In terms of land area, this
region accounts for 19 per cent of the total territory and the sierra for 62 per cent.
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educational system were unequally distributed, widening the gap between
the educational attainment of the white/mestizos and the indigenous
population.
Despite fiscal centralisation, the central government lacked the capacity
to monitor the entire country resulting in adaptations of national policies at
local level. Within this framework, the central government’s initiatives to
expand mass schooling (the Teaching State, the Estado Docente)3 were lost in
translation when articulated by local elites. Educational attainment
improved under centralisation but with unequal reach within the territory.
In this paper, I look at the characteristics and determinants of primary
education provision in Peru from the late 19th century until 1940 by using
district- and province-level data from the 1876 to 1940 national censuses and
the 1902 educational census. This quantitative evidence is supplemented by
qualitative accounts of the unequal provision of and access to education. The
goal of this paper is to look at how political representation and ethnicity
factored in the articulation of public educational campaigns within Peru.
Looking at the local conditions, it is possible to identify how the elites
articulated these policies at the local level and thus unveiling the limits of the
Estado Docente given the unequal educational attainment within the country.
Traditionally, the power of the elites became the dominant explanation
for the historical expansion of primary schooling provision (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2000; Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000). However, new contributions
claim that other forces were at play, especially when looking at the demand
and supply of schooling. In the case of British India, Chaudhary (2009) found
that the presence of caste and religious divisions contributed to a lower
provision of schooling. Looking at the case of the United States, Go and
Lindert (2010) found that decentralisation and political voice explain the
expansion of mass schooling by 1850. Understanding the contributing
factors to unequal educational attainment can help to explain the income
gap between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Peru. Given the
links between human capital accumulation and economic growth, this paper
can help to elucidate Peru’s volatile long-term economic growth path.
To understand the unequal educational outcomes in Peru, I look at the
evolution of school enrolment, attendance and literacy by province together
with the major educational reforms during the 1876-1940 period. In parti-
cular, I study the determinants of schooling in 1940, decades after the
introduction of restrictions to suffrage. The results suggest that lower school
enrolment is associated with a higher share of the indigenous population and
lower political representation. By looking at the regional narratives of this
3 «Estado Docente» is defined as the state assuming the organisation of the educational system.
This move towards the articulation and implementation of educational policies took place within a
larger role of the state as part of a liberal political organisation. The rise of the state as educator
appeared in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Latin America. For a full account of the develop-
ment, see Newland (1994), Narvaez (2005) and Ossenbach (2010).
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period, the unequal expansion of the Estado Docente appears to be connected
to the local elites.
The central government’s national educational campaign was articulated
by local elites leading to unequal access and provision of education.
Decentralisation and inclusive political representations contributed to the
expansion of mass education according to Go and Lindert (2010). Peru as an
elite democracy provides a contrasting example.
In this paper, I first present the evolution of the educational system in
Peru showing the overall trends in literacy and enrolment in comparative
perspective together with the major institutional developments in education
and political participation (sections 3 and 4). For 1940, I offer a simple
theoretical framework to evaluate the determinants of enrolment in Peru for
empirical analysis (section 5). Section 6 provides a deeper discussion of the
unequal educational outcomes observed in the 1876-1940 period, whereas
the following section offers some concluding remarks.
2. GENERAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN PERU IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Let us start with a bird’s-eye view of the educational situation in Peru for
the period of analysis. Clearly, literacy rates, defined as the share of adults that
can read and write, improved substantially as in the late 19th century over
80 per cent of the population could not read or write (see Figure 1)4. By 1940,
the literacy rate had doubled but almost 60 per cent of the population was still
illiterate. Literacy rates are outcome variables; the question is what type of
resources the government allocated to promote education. The data are scarce
and do not cover the entire period; however, the number of schools climbed
significantly from 2,300 in 1876 to reach almost 5,000 by 1940. However, scaled
by the student body, in 1900 there were twenty-five schoolsper 1,000 students
and only eight by 1940, a trend indicative of higher enrolment but insufficient
infrastructure. Yet, the school system only attracted about one-third of all
school-aged children (see Figure 2). These figures provide a dynamic, yet not
particularly successful picture of the Peruvian educational system.
In comparative perspective, Peru figures within the second wave of mass
education in Latin America, behind Argentina and Uruguay, but ahead of
Central American countries. The expansion of education in Latin America
arrived later than in the «West». For example, Germany and the United
States pioneered the development of mass schooling at the beginning of the
19th century (Lindert 2004). The promotion of primary education in Peru
was not unique in the region as the early decades of the 20th century were
4 Following a common practice in the late 19th century, the 1876 census compiled data on the
population literacy based on the ability to read, to write and to read and write. The data used here
correspond to the last category.
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marked by an increase in enrolment and literacy throughout Spanish Latin
America (see Table 1). There is a systematic drop in illiteracy rates, with
Argentina and Uruguay as frontrunners with less than 20 per cent of the
population in the illiterate camp by 1940 (see Table 2). In contrast, by 1940
Peru’s illiteracy rate was still 42 per cent. Despite the improvement in the
early 20th century, these countries were far behind the United States, where
the illiteracy rate was only 3 per cent. This wave was fuelled by an increase of
public resources available for education and a decrease in the costs asso-
ciated with school attendance (Benavot and Riddle (1988); Newland 1994).
Within Latin America, the allocation of resources towards the expansion
of educational services commenced in the late 19th century under the aus-
pices of a «civilising» trend. Following a modernisation trend, the state was
in charge of fighting barbarism and of civilising the masses (Newland 1994).
Education was, among others, a tool to achieve such a goal5. As a result,
FIGURE 1



















Sources: 1876: Dirección De Estadística (1878); 1940: Dirección De Estadística (1940).
5 See for example, Zimmermann (1992) and Graham (2010).
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Sources: 1876: Dirección De Estadística (1878); 1940: Dirección De Estadística (1940).
TABLE 1
ENROLMENT RATES, SELECTED YEARS
1870-75 (%) 1900 (%) 1920 (%) 1935-40 (%)
Argentina 20.9 33.9 52.5 58.2
Bolivia 7.9 15.1 15.5
Ecuador 9.6 21.5 26.8 36.3
Peru 29.2+ 35.4
Uruguay 28.3 35.8 44.6
South America 15.7 22.3 30.4 40.7
Sources: National censuses and Benavot and Riddle (1988).
Notes: +This figure is, most likely, overestimating the actual enrolment given that the 1902 census failed
to truly cover the entire territory.
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we observe a drive towards centralisation by taking the control of education
away from municipalities and placing it into the hands of the central
government in the first decades of the 20th century (Newland 1994). This
move was intended to deliver a uniform push towards modernisation.
Education received an increasing share of public funding reaching, as a
share of the total budget, 13 per cent in Argentina, 14 per cent in Mexico and
20 per cent in Cuba. For primary education only, the shares were around
6 per cent in Peru and 12 per cent in Uruguay by the early 1920s (Direccion
1924; Godoy Urrutia 1952; Baez 1977).
The education sector is a clear example of the ebb and flow of centralisation
in Latin America. In Peru, the 1873 law left elementary and secondary schools
under the purview of local governments, but the progressive movement brought
them back under the power of the central government. This movement
culminated with law 162 in 1905, which inaugurated the «Teaching State»
(Estado Docente) in Peru as defined earlier in the text.
3. DECENTRALISATION, CENTRALISATION AND EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT IN PERU
The first real effort to develop an educational apparatus in Peru came in the
early 1860s. Fuelled by the proceeds from the commodity boom (principally
guano), the expansion of the public sector translated into more funding for
education. The central government retained a minor supervisory role, whereas
allowing local governments to manage municipal schools, which included the
design of curricula and the appointment of teachers (Valcarcel 1975).
TABLE 2
ILLITERACY RATES OF ADULTS AGE 16 AND ABOVE, SELECTED YEARS1
1900 (%) 1920 (%) 1940 (%)
Argentina 48 32 18
Bolivia 84 78 72
Mexico 77 65 53
Peru 76 67 58
Uruguay 41 30 19
Venezuela 81 68 58
United States 11 6 3
Sources: National censuses, Mitchell (1998), Carter et al. (2006).
Note: 1Illiteracy defined as inability to read and write.
THE LIMITS OF THE ESTADO DOCENTE
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 87
From 1873 until 1905, the Peruvian education system was decentralised;
however, the central government still, to some extent, enjoyed interventionist
capabilities. The famous socialist Peruvian intellectual, Mariátegui, thought of
decentralisation as a means to modernise the country by eliminating the
colonial elite. It was President Pardo, in 1873, who promoted the first
decentralising project with the Municipalities Act that allowed districts to
collect local taxes and administer local services. The main focus of
decentralisation was public education, public works, health services, welfare
and civil registry (Presidente de la Republica 1873). In a message to Congress
in 1876, President Pardo highlighted the role of decentralisation and educa-
tion, stating that «what needed to be reformed was not the law but the people
and this reform can only be obtained by education and by local management
of these issues» (Planas Silva (2000), 237)6. According to Mariategui (1964),
President Pardo made education the foundation for freedom in Peru.
Although the presidential message alluded to the benefits of decen-
tralisation for policy effectiveness, the more encompassing decentralisation
of 1886 was «almost a forced option» as the central government was in
shambles after the War of the Pacific (Contreras 2002)7.
This was the first real reform in education prompted by the decline of the
central government’s main source of revenue, the exports of guano and
then the War of the Pacific that had reduced the country’s fiscal capacity
dramatically (Contreras 2002; Espinoza 2013)8. Funding for these services
would come from the transfer of two-thirds of the direct revenues to the
municipalities. In addition, a new tax for school funding (contribución de
escuelas) was levied on all males over twenty-one and import tariffs were
increased by two percentage points9. It appears that the school tax never
came to fruition (Contreras 2002).
With this initiative, each department was responsible for collecting its
own taxes to pay for public spending from 1887 to 1896. As revenue, the
departments had access to personal taxes, land tax, real estate alcabala,
among others10. In return, the department was in charge of funding the
police, the lower courts, elementary education and road maintenance
6 The 1876 code maintained the three divisions in education: primary (three grades), secondary
(two grades, the first one of 4 years and the second of 2 years) and superior (Valcarcel 1975).
7 Public revenue decreased, in real terms, 72 per cent from 1874 to 1878.
8 For example, in 1873, President Pardo cancelled the transfers to municipal schools owing to
the dire state of the fiscal accounts (Espinoza 2013).
9 The proceeds from this source of funding were distributed among the departments as follows:
10 per cent each to Lima and Cusco, 7.5 per cent each to Puno, Ancachs, Junin and Arequipa,
7 per cent each to Ayacucho, Moquegua and Libertad, 6 per cent to Cajamarca, 3 per cent each to
Huancavelica, Callao, Piura, Tarapaca, Ica and Huanuco and 2.5 per cent each to Amazonas and
Loreto (Presidente de la Republica 1873).
10 The central government allocated funds for primary education in the case of fiscal surplus
starting in 1886 (Presidente de la Republica 1886). In the case of Ayacucho, a tax on salt of 5 cents/
46 kg was fully devoted to primary education funding (Presidente de la Republica 1992a, 1992b).
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(Contreras 1996a, 2002). However, this decentralising movement was still
under the tutelage of the central government as departmental budgets were
subject to the approval of Congress. Moreover, the chair of each depart-
mental board was not locally appointed but also chosen by Congress. Given
that the economic base for tax collection was thin, the old colonial tribute,
renamed as poll tax was reinstated11. Despite the central government’s
watchful eye, this was the most important decentralisation movement in
Peru’s history with departmental revenue reaching 24 per cent of central
revenue in 1890 (Romero 1932; Basadre 1968)12.
Education indicators improved, with literacy rising 14 percentage
points from a low of 18 per cent in 1876 as almost a third of school-aged
children enrolled in schools. With the exception of the War of the Pacific
period, the central government’s allocation to education oscillated round
4 per cent of the total budget, representing over 80 per cent of the total
education budget at the department level (Portocarrero et al. 1992; Espinoza
2013).
Decentralisation was short lived13. During what historian Basadre calls
the «aristocratic republic», the centralisation wave gained steam, calling
for national consolidation through fiscal and administrative centralisation.
It is under this centralised system that primary education became free
and compulsory (see Table 3 for chronology of education laws and
regulations).
The factors that fostered investment in public education, such as
urbanisation, economic prosperity and nationalism (Newland 1994), were
common to other Latin American countries. Indeed, early 20th century Peru
was an urban and dynamic economy14. In Peru, this nationalistic movement
attempted to promote integration, especially of the population in the sierra in
order to create a more modern, prosperous and European-style nation
(Valcarcel 1975; Contreras 1996b; Espinoza 2013). Minister of Education
Polar in 1906 claimed, «Democracy cannot be a reality while education is not
extended to all» (cited in Contreras 1996b). This law centralised education in
terms of funding, management and supervision. It made primary education
mandatory and free, requiring a school in every urban settlement of over
200 inhabitants. Selected revenue was earmarked to fund education
11 Males between 21 and 60 years old paid two soles in the sierra and four soles on the coast.
12 Scholars still debate the merits of this decentralisation movement. The critics claim that this
movement left the interior in the hands of the «gamonales», seen as pre-modern elites and exploiters
of the indigenous communities (Basadre 1968).
13 Earlier attempts at centralisation in 1901 were unsuccessful. The 1901 code kept funding
decentralised but created more centralised powers in the form of overseeing institutions at
departmental and national levels. These efforts were ineffective as the municipalities were unwilling
to relinquish control while they continued to fund schools.
14 Annual total GDP growth averaged 5.5 per cent during the first decade of the 20th century
(based on Seminario and Beltrán 1998). Almost 50 per cent of the population lived in urban centres
(Dirección de Estadística 1940).
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(such as mojonazgo — a consumption tax), but overall the central govern-
ment committed 5 per cent of the total revenue and 30 per cent of the
departmental revenue (Poder Ejecutivo 1905).
The 1920s and 1930s saw further centralisation in Peru, especially under
the weight of the Great Depression in the 1930s. The 1920 education law
attempted to grant more stability to the system in terms of funding and
management. It also required the foundation of primary schools in
each district and provincial capital15. The creation of the Central Bank
and the Ministry of Education are examples of the increase of central
government’s power in terms of national policymaking. However, the
experiments with centralisation and decentralisation were uniquely linked to
the fiscal accounts. As the public coffers were deeply dependent on customs
revenue, alternative taxes were secondary for raising revenue. As such, the
fiscal destiny of the country depended on external conditions as domestic
taxes were relegated to a secondary role (Contreras 2002)16. With the
advent of improved economic conditions during the 1940s, the winds of
decentralisation faded as the central government was flooded with customs
revenue from the exports of sugar, cotton, copper, oil and iron. Yet, a 1940
congressional committee on education concluded that only 5 per cent of the
mandates of the 1920 law were actually in effect.
TABLE 3
MAIN PRIMARY EDUCATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
1850 National educational code
1870 Free primary schooling in district capitals
1873 Decentralisation of the school system
1876 Public education code
1905 Centralisation of public primary education
1905 Compulsory and free education
1920 Organic education law
Sources: Based on Barrantes (1989) and Peruvian laws and codes.
Notes: 1870: it also included a mandate of a school in each urban settlement of over 500 inhabitants
(Presidente de la Republica 1870). 1905: for 6-14-year-old males and for 6-12-year-old females
(Poder Ejecutivo 1905).
15 Decentralisation efforts appeared in southern departments resulting in the foundation of the
Decentralisation Party. Despite the decentralisation law of 1933, centralisation took hold, and the
law became a dead letter (Contreras 2002).
16 Junin and Lima are exceptions as their domestic economies were dynamic enough to con-
tribute more revenue (Contreras 2002).
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4. TOWARDS EXCLUSION: THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
As investment in education is the result of politics, any restrictions applied
to political participation constrains representation and can lead to inegalitarian
educational systems. During this period, the transformation of the electoral
system in Peru is a reflection of the power struggle between local elites and the
national government. During most of the 19th century, voting was open to adult
males without a literacy distinction. This practice was a byproduct of the Cadiz
Constitution in which all males over 24 years of age born in the Spanish
domains could vote with the exception of those of African descent17.
Unfortunately, there is no national electoral registry for the 19th century;
however, from selected parishes, the figures indicate that universal male
franchise was exercised. For example, a parish in the province of Huarochiri
shows that 24.1 per cent of all inhabitants had the right to vote. More revealing
is that 94.1 per cent of these voters were of indigenous origin (Nuñez 2005).
This system remained in place throughout most of the 19th century as the new
national leadership considered that the lack of literacy of the population was a
colonial legacy. As such, it was unfair to exclude the illiterate population
(Sobrevilla Perea 2011). This political landscape was disrupted in 1896 with the
introduction of literacy as a requirement for political participation.
By 1896 ~70 per cent of the population remained illiterate. Hence, this
law sidelined a large share of the population, in particular, the indigenous
population. Given the geographical distribution of the population in Peru,
this measure affected the different provinces unequally — the sierra being
the most disenfranchised region in the country. In addition, this law also
stipulated that the members of the electoral boards had to be chosen from a
list of the largest taxpayers per province (Presidente de la República 1896).
This move guaranteed the representation of the most powerful economic
players in the country. The electoral census of 1933 shows this disen-
franchisement clearly: the districts with a majority of indigenous population
had lower representation, measured as a share of the total (male) population.
For example, in the province of Cusco, where the indigenous populations
represented 70 per cent of the total population, less than one-third of the
registered voters were of indigenous origin.
5. DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOLING UNDER CENTRALISATION IN
A POLITICALLY CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT
From 1876 to 1940, Peru’s total population increased by over 130 per cent,
whereas the share of indigenous population declined from 58 per cent
17 Sorted in parishes, one representative for the Electoral College was elected per 200 citizens
(Nuñez 2005).
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to 46 per cent (see Figure 1). With this significant demographic growth,
Peru also achieved progress in terms of education provision. However,
the country-level trends mask the vast diversity in educational attainment and
access in the different regions of Peru. Table 4 shows data on school enrolment
and literacy by department when available (Figure 3).
The variation is substantial in terms of literacy: Apurimac and Puno start
with very low literacy levels and only reach double digits in 1940. The
areas start from a higher level; however, the improvement is such that Callao
and Lima reached over 70 per cent literacy by 1940. Clearly, this is the result
of a larger share of children attending school; the correlation between
literacy and schooling is over 0.9 in 1940. Take, for example, Huanuco, in
1940; only 20 per cent of the school-aged children were actually enrolled in
school. These figures also refer to enrolment, not attendance. The data on
attendance are not available for most years but for the late 1920s, only
two-thirds of the registered students actually attended school, with variations
ranging from a low of 57 per cent for Cusco and Ica and a high of 73 per cent
in Loreto. Geographically, the coastal region is much most successful,
followed by the jungle region, and finally, the mountain one. This stark
geographical division is more telling when considering that over 60 per cent
of the population lived in the sierra region18. Surprisingly, attendance is not
as variable among departments; the sierra region only trails the coastal
region by two percentage points.
Although data by departments give us a more spatially tangible story, it is
possible to look into the smallest political units, the districts. Comparing
1876 with 1940, the average literacy rate, at the district level, was 13 per cent
and 30 per cent (n(1876) = 688 and n(1940) = 1,059), respectively. There was
variability among districts; a few claimed almost perfect literacy with rates
above 90 per cent (three districts in 1876 and five in 1940). At the other end of
the spectrum were districts where there was no provision of education, that
is, 0 per cent of the population was literate (three districts in 1876 and none
in 1940).
From the previous data breakdown, it is clear that the spread of
education was much slower in the sierra region. This is the same region
where the bulk of the indigenous population lived. Looking at the data
based on the share of the indigenous population shows the divergence of
outcomes. In the districts where the share of the non-white population was
lower than 25 per cent, the literacy rate was, on average, 27 per cent in 1876,
whereas in the districts where this share was over 75 per cent, literacy was
15 percentage points lower. This gap widens in 1940, following the same
breakdown; the literacy rate was 44 per cent compared with 13 per cent.
The same pattern is evident in terms of enrolment with a larger share
18 The share of the total population amounted to 61.6 per cent and 56.1 per cent in 1876 and
1940, respectively.
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TABLE 4
LITERACY1 AND SCHOOLING2 RATES, 1876, 1902, 1920S AND 1940 (%)
Literacy1 Schooling2 Attendance
1876 1940 1902 1940 1920s
Amazonas 21.0 35.2 23.4 42.5 71.2
Ancachs 11.7 25.0 22.8 29.3 63.2
Apurimac 4.2 10.8 9.1 15.0 60.5
Arequipa 26.3 44.9 28.9 48.9 66.4
Ayacucho 8.8 12.1 15.3 15.7 63.4
Cajamarca 15.6 25.9 24.4 25.9 69.7
Callao 55.5 78.0 51.4 84.5 63.9
Cuzco 5.6 14.9 14.0 16.9 54.1
Huancavelica 6.1 12.7 13.6 12.4 61.8
Huanuco 9.8 20.0 12.1 20.4 58.8
Ica 35.7 58.4 38.8 61.9 54.1
Junin 10.9 31.7 20.8 34.3 66.7
La Libertad 18.4 35.9 29.2 39.4 66.1
Lambayeque 24.7 44.7 34.5 43.2 65.9
Lima 38.3 71.0 37.1 76.5 64.4
Loreto 13.4 37.3 33.3 44.5 75.1
Madre de Dios n.a. 44.3 n.a. 62.0 61.3
Moquegua 22.4 34.4 20.3 37.0 65.5
Piura 17.3 33.8 18.2 35.0 63.2
Puno 3.0 11.0 12.5 11.8 63.7
San Martin n.a. 44.2 30.3 54.3 63.9
Tacna 27.4 49.4 24.4 58.6 58.5
Tarapaca 35.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tumbes n.a. 47.1 37.7 46.7 62.1
Coastal3 28.4 78.0 31.6 84.5 64.2
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of non-white children enrolled in school: 49 per cent vs. 15 per cent.
Literacy and schooling decreased with a higher share of the non-white
population.
TABLE 4 (Cont. )
Literacy1 Schooling2 Attendance
1876 1940 1902 1940 1920s
Mountain4 8.6 18.7 18.9 20.7 62.9
Jungle5 16.0 36.9 28.8 44.3 69.4
Country 15.0 50.8 29.1 35.4 64.0
Sources: Dirección de Estadística (1878, 1940), Dirección De Primera Enseñanza (1903).
Notes: 1Defined as the share of the adult population unable to read and write.
2Defined as the share of children enrolled in school as share of school-aged population.
3Includes Arequipa, Callao, Ica, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Lima, Moquegua, Piura, Tacna, Tarapaca
and Tumbes.
4Includes Ancachs, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, Junin and Puno.















Total population Indigenous population
Sources: Dirección de Estadística (1878, 1940).
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To understand the unequal educational outcomes in Peru, I analyse the
main determinants of primary schooling in 1940. Following the literature, I
have looked at ways to capture the preferences for education and their
articulation in this society (Chaudhary 2009; Go and Lindert 2010). As the
provision of education depends on the preferences of the different groups
within the districts and provinces, the variance in the educational outcomes
within Peru could suggest different preferences with respect to education.
However, these preferences are materialised through the political process
and as a result the question of the extent of political representation is
relevant. For example, the demand for education could be lower (relatively
speaking) in mostly rural communities as schooling could be less desirable if
child labour were necessary for household income. Child labour existed in
Peru in 1940 and according to the census, 11.05 per cent of the school-aged
population received remuneration for their work19. Occupational categories
are useful to tease out preferences as it is expected that locations with larger
shares of skilled population would demand more educational services for
their offspring.
The heterogeneity of preferences can be exacerbated in fragmented
societies. In India, for example, caste and religious affiliation provided
useful information on preferences on school development (Chaudhary 2009).
However, society in Peru was divided along ethnic and racial lines with
significant differences in the ethnic composition throughout the country.
The coastal provinces had the lowest share of indigenous population
averaging 20.8 per cent, followed by the jungle provinces with 36.9 per cent,
whereas in the sierra the indigenous share climbed to 60 per cent. The
established ethnolinguistic fractionalisation literature suggests that high
fractionalisation leads to poor quality institutions, underprovision of public
services, lower investment and even lower economic growth owing to
mismatched preferences and polarisation. In a highly diverse community,
where ethnic and racial distinctions are also associated with economic
power, this division could lead to suboptimal educational provision. This
situation arises as the benefits from investment in schooling provision are
not appropriated in an egalitarian manner (Mauro 1995; Easterly and Levine
1997; Alesina 2003).
Although the identification of preferences accounts for demand factors
in school provision, the question is how these preferences are articulated
in the political system. As such, political representation plays a dual role.
It first expresses the preferences of those with access to the electoral process,
but it also translates the educational initiatives from national to local
levels. In Peru, the movement towards education centralisation tried to
erode the local power on educational provision. The central government
19 Even though the 1920 education law prohibited child labour, the census notes that socio-
economic factors forced children to work.
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abolished the school councils and commissions that were in hands of
local officials. However, local governments fought hard to regain some
independence and succeeded, to an extent, with the reinstatement of muni-
cipal school inspectors (Espinoza 2013). As Go and Lindert (2010) showed
for the case of the United States, decentralised governments with inclusive
political representation were key factors in the expansion of mass education.
Being an elite democracy, Peru is a study in contrast. Although education
was a national centralised initiative, it was carried out in practice by
local elites.
The analysis uses data from a variety of official sources. The educational
attainment variable, enrolment measured as the share of school-aged
children enrolled in school, is from the 1940 national census published
by the Dirección de Estadística (1940). To analyse the issue of political
representation, I used the electoral census of 1933 published by the
Dirección de Estadística (1933)20. All the data are at district or provincial
level21.
The 1933 electoral census has detailed data on the number of registered
voters at district level. However, at provincial level, the publication also
reports race and ethnicity, voter turnout, education level of registered voters
and occupations.
Exploiting the variety of educational outcomes within Peru, I estimate
the impact of different factors on schooling provision for 194022. The
educational outcomes (E) used are enrolment, as the share of school-aged
population, and literacy, as a share of total adult population23. The deter-
minants include political representation measured as voters as a share of
total adults (Voters), ethnic/racial-based preferences represented by shares of
the different ethnic categories (Indigenous, White/Mestizo, Black and Asian—
White/Mestizo is the excluded category), social fragmentation by estimating
an index of ethnic fractionalisation (EF)24, occupational mix based on broad
categories (Agriculture, Manufacturing, Commerce and Professionals —
Services is the excluded category)25, and a proxy for income represented by
the urbanisation rate (Urban), measured as the share of the population living
20 Other supplementary data, not at district level, include school attendance, number of schools
and number of teachers, collected from an array of official statistical compendia.
21 The political division of Peru has three levels: the districts or municipalities are the smallest
political units followed by provinces, which in turn, form departments.
22 The 1876 census only provides data on literacy. Although it would be interesting to explore a
different approach, the main problem is that there are no data on political representation
before 1933.
23 The literature uses other outcome variables such as teachers or schools/1,000 pupils.
Unfortunately the data are only available at the department level. Although literacy is, most likely,
endogenous, as the voting was restricted to the literate male population, I offer the estimations
using literacy as a dependent variable to provide an imperfect robustness check.
24 This index is calculated as EF ¼ 1Pi π2 where π is the share of ethnic group i and refers
only to ethnic/racial categories.
25 This classification follows Chaudhary (2009) and includes livestock as part of agriculture.
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in cities of at least 1,000 inhabitants26. To account for the degree of auton-
omy of the provincial governments, I use the distance by road to Lima as a
proxy, Distance. The rationale of this variable is that given the regional elites,
the farther away the province was, the less likely that the central government
in Lima could exert monitoring power. The distance is measured as the
shortest route to Lima using the existing road system in the 1940s.
The reduced form for district or province i estimation is presented in
equation [1] including department dummies (X) and geographical controls
such as altitude, longitude, latitude and land area. Owing to the hetero-
geneity of all provinces the estimation included standard error clustering at
province level.
Ei ¼ β0 + β1Voters + ρDistance +ω1Indigenousi +ω2Blacki
+ω3Asiansi +ϕEFi +φ1Agriculturei
+φ2Manufacturingi +φ3Commercei
+φ4Professionalsi +ΘUrbani + λXi + ϵi
The main results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. The first table looks at the
factors influencing the school enrolment rate defined as the share of school-
aged children enrolled in school. Starting with political participation, it
appears that a higher share of participation in the political system has a
positive effect on enrolment. The coefficients are all significant even though
they decrease with the addition of other factors. In the most conservative
case, an increase in one standard deviation of voter share could have raised
enrolment by almost five percentage points. Distance to Lima, a proxy for
degree of autonomy, proves to have been detrimental to educational attain-
ment; however, the coefficients are very small and mostly non-significant.
This factor is more indicative of the latitude that local elites enjoyed to
mould educational policies to local conditions.
The inclusion of demand factors contributes to attenuate the effect of
political voice, as expected. In terms of occupational structure, the results
indicate that a larger presence of professionals has a positive effect on
enrolment. For the rest of occupations, the results are not significant. What is
most striking is that the main determinant for enrolment is ethnic.
The results suggest that the lack of political participation paired up with
the extent of indigenous composition of the population drove enrolment.
When using literacy as the dependent variable (see Table 6), the main
results hold: the main determinants of literacy are political participation
and indigenous share in the total population. Overall the estimations
suggest that the lack of representation of indigenous populations affects
26 Unfortunately the census did not collect data on income, tax incidence or tax revenue.
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TABLE 5
OLS RESULTS (1)1
1The dependent variable is school enrolment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voter 2.589 (0.798)** 1.478 (0.687)* 1.206 (0.712)* 1.165 (0.676)* 1.138 (0.684)*
Distance −0.009 (0.006) −0.011 (0.007) −0.012 (0.006) −0.010 (0.008) −0.010 (0.008)
Indigenous −0.345 (0.086)*** −0.325 (0.075)*** −0.251 (0.072)*** −0.247 (0.070)***
Black −0.336 (0.847) −0.0615 (0.792) 0.281 (0.667) 0.328 (0.682)
Asian 4.747 (1.869)** 3.998 (2.132)* −0.00608 (3.459) 0.205 (3.570)
Urban 0.150 (0.075)** 0.0929 (0.072) 0.0943 (0.072)
Agriculture 0.0199 (0.241) −0.0151 (0.266)
Manufacturing −0.998 (0.751) −0.949 (0.775)
Commerce −0.415(1.108) −0.475 (1.095)
Professionals 3.376 (1.469)** 3.158 (1.657)*
EF −0.0313 (0.080)
Constant 0.120 (0.101) 1.202 (1.923) 0.598 (1.735) −0.923 (1.611) −0.788 (1.671)
n 113 113 111 111 111
Department dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Geo controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Province level clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Enrolment rate is defined as the share of the school-aged population enrolled in school, voter is the share of the voting adult population, distance is the
shortest distance in millions of kilometres from the provincial capital city to Lima using the 1940 road network, indigenous, Black and Asian are as shares of
the total population, urban is the share of the population living in cities of at least 1,000 inhabitants, EF is the index of ethnic fractionalisation, Agriculture,
Manufacturing, Commerce, Professionals are shares of the total labour force, geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude and area.

















































1The dependent variable is literacy rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voter 1.974 (0.503)*** 1.196 (0.488)** 1.073 (0.478)** 1.109 (0.516)** 1.199 (0.497)**
Distance 0.0041 (−0.0047) −0.0003 (−0.0050) −0.0070 (−0.0044) −0.0003 (−0.0054) −0.0003 (−0.0056)
Indigenous −0.291 (0.076)*** −0.281 (0.070)*** −0.248 (0.070)*** −0.260 (0.066)***
Black 0.33 (0.525) 0.463 (0.541) 0.27 (0.508) 0.113 (0.541)
Asian 4.837 (1.357)*** 4.661 (1.434)*** 2.91 (2.283) 2.211 (2.488)
Urban 0.0723 (0.057) −0.00589 (0.060) −0.0105 (0.062)
Agriculture −0.0971 (0.206) 0.019 (0.232)
Manufacturing 0.467 (0.791) 0.301 (0.811)
Commerce 1.238 (0.843) 1.436 (0.847)*
Professionals 1.021 (1.405) 1.743 (1.541)
EF 0.104 (0.073)
Constant 0.073 (0.075) 3.141 (1.545)* 2.854 (1.566) 2.615 (1.582) 2.166 (1.542)
n 113 113 111 98 98
Department controls Y Y Y Y Y
Geo controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Province level clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Literacy rate is defined as the share of the adult population that can read and write, voter is the share of the voting adult population, distance is the shortest
distance in millions of kilometres from the provincial capital city to Lima using the 1940 road network, indigenous, Black and Asian are as shares of the total
population, Urban is the share of the population living in cities of at least 1,000 inhabitants, EF is the index of ethnic fractionalisation, Agriculture, Manu-
facturing, Commerce, Professionals are shares of the total labour force, geographic controls include latitude, longitude, altitude and area.






















































bridge.org/core. 09 Apr 2021 at 11:11:12, subject to the Cam
bridge Core term
s of use.
educational outcomes27. It appears that constrained access to the political
system generated educational inequality along ethnic lines.
A common concern in this type of analysis is ignoring the potential effect
of historical institutions on educational outcomes and political institutions.
It is plausible that the degree of political representation is a manifestation of
deeper inegalitarian institutions, possibly going back to colonial times. The
ample literature on the persistence of institutions states that places with
more «extractive» institutions have persisting detrimental effects in con-
temporary economic outcomes. In the case of Peru, the long arm of history
would suggest that the regions with more oppressive colonial institutions
would display worse economic outcomes today (Engerman and Sokoloff
1997; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Dell 2010; Gallego 2010). Following the
persistence argument, these unfavourable effects should prevail throughout
time. Hence, locations with more inegalitarian electoral institutions should
be correlated with the historical presence of oppressive or extractive colonial
institutions.
For Peru, it is possible to identify the existence of these institutions. Two
institutions are of particular interest: the mita and the encomienda. The
encomienda was a colonial practice by which the Spanish Crown granted the
conquistadors and selected new settlers the service of indigenous peoples.
The recipients had the duty to protect and educate the Indians in the Catholic
faith. As nobility titles did not exist in the Spanish empire in the Americas,
holding an encomienda became a source of prestige and power. However,
this development led to the dissolution of this institution as it represented a
threat to royal authority (Zavala 1935; Puente Brunke 1992). The Spaniards
in Peru and Bolivia adapted the Incan mita to guarantee labour in the mines.
Established by viceroy Toledo in the late 16th century, this system of coerced
but remunerated labour involved one-seventh of the male adult population.
It was only abolished in 1820 (Wiedner 1960; Cole 1984).
The geographical extension of these two institutions was not uniform.
There were some locations that were subject to both, but many that did
not have these obligations28. To address the potential effect of colonial
institutions on educational outcomes, I include the presence or absence of
these two colonial institutions as independent variables. If colonial institu-
tions were to have any explanatory power, they should appear significant
in the regression29. However, the presence of these extractive institutions in
27 It could be argued that the level of literacy or schooling depends on linguistic issues.
Indigenous households may not enrol their offspring at school if the only language spoken was of
indigenous origin. Replacing the share of indigenous population by the share of population
speaking only an indigenous language does not change the results.
28 See Cole (1984), Manso De Velasco and Amat y Junient (1859) and Puente Brunke (1992) for
the locations under the mita and encomienda systems.
29 It should be noted that Dell’s (2010) methodology is quite different from that used in this
article. First, she applied a regression discontinuity framework and estimated the effects of the
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the past does not shed any light on the educational outcomes in early
20th century Peru30.
6. UNEQUAL PARTICIPATION, UNEQUAL OUTCOMES? EXPLAINING
THE EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN PERU
The educational inequality observed in Peru during this period is not
unique. Chaudhary et al. (2012) report a similar pattern in Brazil, Russia,
India and China (BRICs) in the early 20th century. For example, in Brazil, the
state with highest enrolment in 1914 was the Federal District (32.7 per cent),
whereas that with the lowest was Paraiba (6.3 per cent). To put these figures
into perspective, in the case of Peru in 1902, the province with highest
enrolment was Canta (a department of Lima) with 59 per cent and the lowest
one was Caylloma (a department of Arequipa) with an enrolment rate of
3.7 per cent. This comparison, at first glance, shows the wider range of
educational outcomes in Peru relative to highly unequal Brazil. A more
systematic way to present this is by calculating the coefficient of variation.
Peru displays more spatial variability with a coefficient of variation of
0.62, higher than any of the BRICs (0.5, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, respectively).
The low educational attainment in regions with higher concentrations of
indigenous population could be read as the result of either low demand or
low supply of educational services. In more rural districts with high shares of
indigenous population, literacy rates are lower, on average, than in more
urban settings. Looking at the subgroup of districts with urbanisation rates
lower than 25 per cent and non-white population shares of over 75 per cent
(n = 116), the literacy rate is 5.2 per cent in 1876. This could be the result of
low participation in the educational systems: children are generally needed
for labour in agriculture, for example. However, this problem should be
reflected in attendance more than in enrolment, expecting lower attendance
in more rural areas. Looking at the limited data on attendance at the
department level, there is not much variability in overall attendance and
there is no direct relationship between urbanisation rates and attendance.
Moreover, the indigenistas in Puno and the Highlands were advocating
for expansion of education to the indigenous population as early as the
beginning of the 20th century. As this group acted as brokers between the
indigenous population and local and central governments, this engagement
(footnote continued)
presence of the mita on districts at different distances from the «mita region». In this paper, I used
this information as a dummy variable given that this coerced draft system was based on a province
level. Second, as I am considering the entire country and not the «mita region», I also included a
dummy variable denoting the presence of another colonial institution deemed by the literature as a
privilege for the colonisers, the encomienda.
30 Regressing political representation on these two institutions does not change the results.
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suggests a high demand for education. However, this movement also
represented a threat to the elite in this highly racially stratified society
(Hazen 1978).
Indigenous demand for education was manifested in different ways;
for example, through donations of lands for schools (Contreras 2002).
In locations not served by the government, such as in several towns in
Ancash and Chucuito, the indigenous communities asked the central
government for funding for their schools and founded their own schools
known as «free schools». Many of these initiatives did not last owing to
financial considerations and strong local elite opposition (Contreras 2002;
Ccahuana Córdova 2003). The demand for education was also part of the
aspirations of local indigenous movements as literacy would bring political
participation and better economic prospects, such as in Ayacucho (Heilman
2010).
As the demand for schooling does not seem to be the main culprit to
explain the divergence of outcomes, it appears that there was an inadequate
supply of educational services. The department-based data show that there
was a wide variance in the number of schools. However, a better metric is
the number of schools scaled by school-aged population as it reflects the
infrastructure needed to serve the entire school-aged population. In Puno,
the department with the lowest literacy level in 1940, there were only
1.8 schools/1,000 school-aged inhabitants, whereas a higher literacy level
department such as Tacna had 8.4. These raw figures do not take into
account the topography: in mountainous regions, more schools may be
necessary to make access possible. The relationship between literacy and
school availability is slightly positive; however, the operational link appears
to be with enrolment: more children went to school where schools were more
readily available. If this is a supply-side story, then it is necessary to look at
the political factors affecting the provision of educational services in Peru
during this period (Go and Lindert 2010).
A quick look at the federal budget illustrates the revealed preference
of the federal government with respect to education. During the early
20th century, the federal government allocated less than 6 per cent of the total
budget to education. This figure is low compared with the share of resources
allocated to defence: around 20 per cent (see Figure 4). In real terms, the
total budget grew rapidly from 1900 to 1940; however, so did population. The
school-aged population soared from 340,000 children in 1902 to 1.6 million
in 1940. Compared with similar countries in terms of ethnic makeup, such as
Bolivia, Peru devoted a smaller share of its total budget to education and also
in terms of GDP. Education spending was a meagre 0.15 per cent of
GDP compared with 0.36 per cent in Bolivia during the 1900-1940 period
(Péres-Cajías 2013; Arroyo Abad and Lindert 2015).
During the decentralisation period, the sluggish progress in education is
found in local governments. Education policy was under the control of local
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elites before and after the decentralisation of 1873. Municipal funds mostly
financed education until 1850, when the central government allocated
subsidies and the local administration was autonomous in terms of financial,
administrative and financial matters. At the height of the guano boom
(1850-1870), the central government aspired to exert more control over the
local elites by redistributing the proceeds from guano; however, the authority
on education remained at the local level. The local elites remained in
charge as the central government lacked the capacity to monitor municipal
education (Espinoza 2011).
With decentralisation, taxes at the departmental and municipal levels
such as the «contribución de escuelas» had to fund education. Fear of unrest
and political instability made the local elites reluctant to levy such taxes
(Espinoza 2011). This is a reflection of the inexistence of local elites capable
of or willing to lead efficient decentralised policies. In southern Peru, local
officials ignored the directives put forth by Lima. In some instances, they
FIGURE 4



















Education War and Navy
Notes: *Primary and secondary education, + central government.
Sources: Based on Dirección de Estadística (1924) and Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio
(1918, 1943).
THE LIMITS OF THE ESTADO DOCENTE
Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 103
even failed to spend the departmental funds assigned for schooling. One of
Lima’s initiatives to appoint German teachers in Cuzco, Puno and Piura
ended up with one of them in jail owing to «irascible and discourteous
behavior» and in the end led to their dismissal (Contreras 2000; Muecke
2004, p. 181). The War of the Pacific with the destruction of the bureaucratic
apparatus granted more power to the local elites (Espinoza 2011).
The education system in the Andes did not develop according to the
central government’s design but was shaped by local interests. The national
educational plan was resisted by the local elites leading to its failure. In
particular, the elites in the sierra, the sierra gamonales, dismantled the local
initiatives to build schools and contract teachers (Contreras 1996a). Many
elites had a negative view of the local population. When commenting on
Puno, a railroad inspector claimed that «Four-fifths of the population are like
wild animals, and the few who call themselves educated have — with the
exception of four or five people— succumbed to vice» (Muecke 2004, p. 181).
This is a textbook case of decentralisation gone wrong. The decentralisation
movement attempted to confer legitimacy on local authorities. Yet, it
resulted in conflicts for local control that eroded the potential benefits of
such a movement. The competing groups fought over influence for personal
(or family) economic and political gains. When the elites did not value
education, they would not allocate funds to support it, leading to suboptimal
educational outcomes, in particular in districts with a high concentration of
the economic minority.
The centralisation movement had a nationalistic mindset, to bring
different segments of the community to the nation; however, the project also
intended to enhance the reach of the central government31. The expansion of
the middle class with the post-war recovery also increased the demand for
education, seeing educational attainment as a tool for social progress (Parker
1998)32. To achieve mass education, the government committed more funds
than ever; as a share of total spending the allocation to education climbed
three percentage points, from 3.7 to 6.7 per cent from 1904 to 1907. The
increasing availability of funds was an integral component in making the
expansion of education politically feasible. However, local elites used public
funding to strengthen their patronage networks. Still, the transition to
provision of education as mandated by central government was not seamless.
The plan to increase monitoring by the central government through school
inspectors, preceptores, was met with resistance to the point of their
abolishment. Although the increase in education inputs (such as schools
31 Espinoza (2013) claims that positivism and nationalism were important factors in the cen-
tralisation movement; however, the main objective was to acquire more political power for the
central government.
32 The middle class saw the expansion of education as a mixed blessing. On one hand a uni-
versity degree was within reach; however, the higher completion rates of secondary education
eroded their position in the labour market (Parker 1998).
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and teachers) did result in an increase in enrolment and literacy, the
expansion of education had uneven effects, as indigenous people were not
considered full citizens but potential workers and soldiers (Espinoza 2013).
Looking at the entire period, the process of education provision in Peru is,
at heart, a question of local vs. central political power. After the War of the
Pacific, with the guano riches gone, the central government failed to achieve
national consolidation and local elites regained local power (Klaren 1986)33.
The decentralisation period is consistent with Mariscal and Sokoloff’s thesis.
The local elites, when in charge of provision of public education, chose not to
allocate resources to it. This result questions the literature on the merits of
decentralisation as a vehicle for more efficient provision of education. As
Hazen (1978, p. 428) comments, «Elementary instruction had formerly
been a municipal responsibility. Not surprisingly, facilities were everywhere
inadequate». With the move to centralisation, the elite, to some extent,
acquiesced to the national education project, driven not just by the natio-
nalistic sentiment born from the War of the Pacific but lured by increasing
funds from the central government. In this sense, our finding challenges the
Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000) hypothesis and the critics of centralisation.
Nevertheless, the advance in educational outcomes during this period was
not fully encompassing or integrative; in districts with high concentrations of
indigenous population, progress was slow.
Although the central government envisioned a national education plan, the
lack of political participation of the economic minority shaped the extent and
spread of this plan. Only 25 per cent of the registered voters were either
indigenous or black according to the electoral census (1933), whereas the total
population share was about 50 per cent. In addition, the number of voters from
departments with high concentrations of indigenous population also had lower
representation relative to other departments. Lima was over-represented with
25 per cent of all the registered voters while concentrating on 14 per cent of the
population. Cuzco, Huancavelica and Puno had 9 per cent of the total registered
voters while having over 22 per cent of the total population. The 1940 census
revealed the failure of the educational campaign; enrolment in the sierra, where
the bulk of both the total population and the indigenous population lived, had
barely increased since 1902 (see Table 4) and according to Contreras (2002), the
local elite resistance was to blame for this outcome.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have looked at the different educational policies and their
effects on educational outcomes in Peru from 1876 to 1940. During this
33 The literature on this period clearly portrays Peru as a fragmented country, with powerful
local elites. See for example, Basadre (1968), Burga and Flores Galindo (1979), Caravedo (1979),
Cotler (1978). For Cajamarca, see Taylor (1986) and for Huancavelica, see Favre (1965).
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period, Peru embarked on an expansion of education under different degrees
of fiscal centralisation. The results of these policies were an increase in
literacy from a low of 18 per cent in 1876 to 42 per cent in 1940.
With the advent of the centralisation movement in 1905, the central
government took charge of education, devoting a higher share of resources.
The expansion of education was achieved under a more restrictive system of
political participation where only literate adult males could vote. Under the
new «Teaching State» (Estado Docente) with the influence of positivism and
the new nationalistic shift, the elites negotiated their role in the new
education plan; however, the influx of resources turned into support of the
existing patronage networks.
The resistance to the federal initiatives was at times challenged but it did
not fully stop the expansion of educational services. Despite the efforts, the
articulation of these policies at the local level was not evenly distributed. The
achievement gap between areas with high and low indigenous populations
widened. The empirical analysis suggests that the constrained political
access of the economic minority resulted in a suboptimal provision of
educational services. The results imply that the lack of political representa-
tion had an enduring imprint on the policies forged and implemented.
Given the more restrictive nature of the electoral process, the indigenous
population’s participation in the political process was constrained and its
voice muted.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that the extension of the franchise
in the West was a strategic move by the elites to prevent social unrest. By
allowing a more inclusive franchise, the elites were trading off stability today
with more redistribution tomorrow. In the case of Peru, the elites restricted
voting rights while at the same time expanding social services. What is
surprising about the Peruvian case is that together with the more restrictive
electoral constraints, the expansion of the education system occurred; albeit
with a non-egalitarian reach.
Looking at the Americas, Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000) claim that
political inequality, measured as access to voting, had a positive effect on
school enrolment. This work views the elite as an undifferentiated
group when in reality, especially in Peru, there was a distinction between
national and local elites. The degree of alliance or resistance between the
national and local elites yields different forms of education provision.
These findings are consistent with Chaudhary et al. (2012) as they explore
the dynamics between local and national elites and provision of education in
the BRIC countries. For developed countries, Lindert (2004) noted that
an elite democracy in which less than 40 per cent of the male adults actually
voted did not produce more primary schooling than a non-democracy. His
insights are in line with the experience observed in Peru under a limited
democracy where only a quarter of all adult males were actually registered
to vote.
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